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Cyberspace Operations Planning 
Operating a Technical Military Force Beyond the Kinetic Domains 
DON E. BARBER,  United States Navy 
T. ALAN BOBO,  United States Air Force, Retired 
KEVIN P. STURM,  United States Army Reserve 
Traditional military planning has matured over the centuries and provides a proven foundation to achieve specific objectives. 
Planning for operations in cyberspace, however, goes beyond what is typically required in planning for ‘kinetic’ military 
operations, employing munitions against physical targets. To capture the incredible nuance required to conduct cyber 
operations, it is useful to conceptualize a deeper, more technical level of warfare planning that illuminates the role of technical 
implementation that supports tactical planning. The technical details associated with cyberspace operations are not as intuitive 
to planners and commanders as the capabilities and limitations of tanks, ships, and aircraft. In cyberspace planning this 
additional technical level is required to translate impacts on non-intuitive components into readily understandable effects on 
adversary operations. Noting the importance of technical cyber planning, it nevertheless remains critically important to ensure 
that focused technical operations continue to clearly tie back to a commander’s operational effect requirements and national 
strategic objectives. This paper attempts to capture the highlights of U.S. Joint military doctrine and incorporate best practices 
from the commercial sector to outline a process that the DoD’s new cyber mission force could employ. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As cyberspace continues to become increasingly integral to our way of life, threats from cyber 
criminals and nation state actors continue to grow ever more pervasive. We depend on computers in 
almost every aspect of our lives, from controlling our cars and communications, to maintaining our 
bank accounts and medical records, and even running public utilities. Like the broader population, 
our government and military also depend heavily on cyberspace to operate and communicate.  
   While networked computers offer tremendous opportunities for unprecedented collaboration, high 
speed processing, and big data analytics; time and again hackers have been able to find vulnerabilities 
to exploit these same systems to malicious ends. Malicious cyber activity runs the gamut, from 
stealing money, personal information, and intellectual property, to vindictively damaging systems and 
networks through denial of service attacks, to the possibility of damage to critical infrastructure. 
Hackers have attacked the financial sector across the spectrum from denial of service attacks on 
banks to stealing credit card data during point-of-sale transactions at major retailers.1,2,3 Large, 
orchestrated attacks against a major casino and movie studio appear to be targeted attacks by nation 
states to achieve political objectives.4,5 Ongoing theft of intellectual property, including details of a 
next generation military fighter aircraft, undermines national strategic investments.6 
 
                                                 
 
1 Joseph Menn, "Cyber attacks against banks more severe than most realize," Reuters, May 18, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/18/us-cyber-summit-banks-idUSBRE94G0ZP20130518. 
2 Chris Isidore, "Target: Hacking Hit Up to 110 Million Customers," CNN, January 11, 2014, 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/10/news/companies/target-hacking. 
3 Shelly Banjo, "Home Depot Hackers Exposed 53 Million email addresses," Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-hackers-used-passwords-stolen-from-vendor-1415309282. 
4 Bill Elgin and Michael Riley, "Now at the Sands Casino: An Iranian Hacker in Every Server," Bloomberg, December 11, 2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-12-11/iranian-hackers-hit-sheldon-adelsons-sands-casino-in-las-vegas. 
5 Kim Zetter, "Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don't Know So Far," Wired, December 3, 2014, 
http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know. 
6 Bill Gertz, "Top Gun takeover: Stolen F-35 secrets now showing up in China's Stealth Fighter," Washington Free Beacon, 
March 13, 2104, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/13/f-35-secrets-now-showing-chinas-stealth-fighter. 
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 The Department of Defense Strategy 
As outlined in the recent 2015 Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy, the DoD plans to work in 
concert with other government agencies and international allies to counter these pervasive threats. 
The DoD's first goal is to protect its own networks, systems, and information. Their second mission is 
to be prepared to defend the U.S. and its interests against cyber-attacks of significant consequence, 
which “may include loss of life, significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy 
consequences, or serious economic impact .7 To accomplish these goals, the DoD is investing in 
building a cyber mission force to provide resilience, deny attacks, and respond to cyber-attacks as 
directed.8 
   Military planning and operating concepts have matured over the centuries and provide a proven 
foundation for operating as a team to achieve objectives; so much so that countless books have applied 
military principles to business management. However, while a military organization must also tackle 
cyber threats to the nation in a deliberate and organized manner, the nuances of conducting 
operations in cyberspace go beyond what is typically required in planning for 'kinetic' military 
operations employing munitions against physical targets. This paper attempts to capture highlights of 
U.S. Joint military doctrine and incorporate "best practices" principles from the commercial sector to 
outline a process that the DoD's new cyber mission force could usefully employ. 
 Layers of Military Planning 
The U.S. process of planning and employing military capabilities and countermeasures to deter, and 
ultimately defeat, aggression is captured in Joint Publications from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strategic 
guidance, coupled with those missions found in the DoD Cyber Strategy, is passed down the chain of 
command in campaign plans to allow operational planners to develop concepts of operations. Joint 
Publication 3-0 captures the relationship between strategic and operational art, linking tactical 
actions by military commanders to a strategic purpose, as articulated by the President and National 
Security Staff.9 These gears are inextricably linked. Overarching strategic policy objectives steer the 
development of operational plans, while the resulting tactical outcomes provide feedback as they 
influence the larger strategic and operational environments. Leveraging this paradigm, cyber forces 
are structured in a military hierarchy to allow operational unity of effort, while maintaining proper 
planning division of labor at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to accomplish the mission of 
defending the U.S. in cyberspace.  
   Cyber operations can be very complex, and it is useful to conceptualize a deeper, fourth technical 
level of warfare in order to conduct effective planning. Figure 1 illustrates the critical importance of 
properly incorporating technical aspects of cyber into the tactical planning phase. The technical 
details associated with cyberspace operations are not grasped as intuitively by planners and 
commanders as are the capabilities and limitations of tanks, ships, and aircraft. While advanced 
research and engineering are inherent in the development of modem military systems, they are 
"baked-in" before the platforms are provided to tactical commanders. The complex and dynamic 
nature of cyberspace often drives technical analysis and planning to a level beyond those planning 
practices and procedures accommodated by traditional Joint doctrine. 
   Noting the importance of technical cyber planning beyond traditional military planning, it remains 
critically important to work through the disciplined military hierarchy of planning to ensure focused 
technical operations continue to clearly tie back to national strategic objectives. It can be easy to lose 
the forest for the trees, or even leaves, if operations directors become fixated on nuanced technical 
operations without keeping sight of the desired end state. 
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of Defense. DoD Cyber Strategy. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 17, 2015), 4. 
8Ibid., 4-5. 
9 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Operations," Joint Publication 3-0. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 
2011). 
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Fig. 1. Layers of Cyber Planning 
2. OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
In brief, operational planning decomposes the strategic objectives, such as preventing malicious cyber-
attacks to critical U.S. networks, in order to identify adversary centers of gravity and potential 
vulnerabilities.10 This process informs development of courses of action necessary to effectively impact 
those centers of gravity.  
   Joint Publication 5-0 illustrates the mission analysis process examining an exemplar adversary 
armored corps as the center of gravity within a larger army. One critical capability that supports the 
adversary armored corps is an integrated air defense system, protecting their tanks from attacks by 
aircraft. The air defense network itself requires radars, launchers, and command and control 
capabilities. Operational-level analysis identifies these critical capabilities and critical requirements 
to uncover critical vulnerabilities that can be targeted to significantly degrade the threat posed by the 
adversary. Rather than directly confronting the adversary's full supported army, it may be possible to 
first neutralize adversary enablers, such as radar or communications, to indirectly defeat the threat 
rather than attack it head on.11 
   In order to defend in cyberspace, a similar analysis of centers of gravity for malicious cyber actors is 
needed to identify and characterize the threat at the technical and granular level necessary to 
operationally implement the broad strategic guidance of 'protect DOD and other U.S. networks'. 
Similar to identifying the defeat of an armored corps as critical to defeating an attacking army, there 
may be specific hacker groups that are centers of gravity in malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. 
networks. Through the application of intelligence resources, operational level commanders will 
identify these functional groups to enable operational planners to study them and identify the 
requirements and vulnerabilities in the hacker's cyber-attack processes. As military air defense needs 
radar to target missiles, likewise, a hacker may require network mapping of their target to conduct 
targeted cyber-attacks as a critical requirement. 
 Kill Chains 
Numerous academic and commercial efforts engaged in network defense have already created basic 
models of the lifecycle of a cyber attacker which can be leveraged as a baseline to help identify 
hackers' processes and requirements. One frequently used network security textbook provides six 
                                                 
10 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Operation Planning," Joint Publication 5-0. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
August 11, 2011), IV-4. 
11 Ibid. 
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phases of an attack: targeting, access/compromise, reconnaissance, lateral movement, data 
collection/exfiltration, and administration and maintenance.12 In a 2015 trend report, a computer 
security firm outlined attacker techniques seen during recent point of sale compromises (including 
those mentioned in the introduction) as being composed of: initial compromise, establish foothold, 
escalate privileges, internal recon, move laterally, maintain persistence, and complete mission.13 A 
major defense contractor proposed a similar ''cyber kill chain" framework consisting of: 
reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and action 
on objective.14 Even from just these three examples, we can see diverse organizations using the basic 
process of operational analysis to decompose cyber threats and the emergence of a relatively uniform 
set of critical requirements needed for any cyber attacker to carry out sophisticated attacks.  
   In 2013, the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan Greenert, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
General Mark Welsh began to publically discuss the concept of breaking the kill chain in a traditional 
military context to counter adversary threats.15 As previously articulated by other works, breaking a 
function or even a single step within the adversary process can interrupt the entire process, requiring 
a restart or adaptation to be made in order for the adversary to continue.16  
   Thicker armor and point defense systems are very expensive and bring risk right to the defended 
platform in a conventional conflict as well as in cyberspace. Where it is possible, it is safer and more 
cost effective to stop the archer than the arrow. Also, whenever possible, it is preferable to work 
against earlier phases in the kill chain to disrupt processes like reconnaissance or initial compromise, 
as it preempts overall adversary functions and eliminates the need for point defense or remediation 
within the protected networks. 
 Targeting 
Operational plans drive tactical planning analysis by identifying specific threat actors and functions 
that must be countered to achieve the strategic end state. Tactical level planning then specifies key 
processes through kill chain analysis that can be impacted to create the desired operational level 
effects. After critical processes in the kill chain are identified, further technical analysis identifies 
tangible component elements, which are critical to the processes and functions they support, that can 
be directly impacted through tactical level actions. In cyberspace, an additional level of technical 
planning, beyond traditional tactical military planning, is required to translate impacts on non-
intuitive cyber components into readily understandable effects.  
   Identifying specific target elements that support the overall target systems, and in turn critical 
functions of the center of gravity, allows commanders to prioritize and assign forces to take actions to 
impact tangible target system elements. Joint Publication 3-60 provides an example of identifying 
targets in a notional adversary air defense system. A successful air defense system performs several 
functions in order to achieve its aims - a failure to complete one of these functions, like radar 
identification, launching intercept aircraft, or firing surface to air missiles will likely result in the 
overall failure of the system. In order to affect an air defense target system, planners assess the 
component processes supporting those air defense functions that can be affected with the resources 
available and that will have the most significant impact on the overall target system.  
                                                 
12 Stewart McClure, Joel Scambray, and George Kurtz, Hacking Exposed 7: Network Security Secrets and Solutions. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2012), 316-317. 
13 "M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines", Mandiant, 2015, http://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireeye/i mages/rpt-m-trends-
2015.pdf. 
14 Eric Hutchins, Michael Cloppert, and Rohan Amin, "Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of 
Adversary Campaigns, and Intrusion Kill Chains," Leading Issues in Information Warfare and Security Research (2011). 
15 Jonathan Greenert and Mark Welsh, "Breaking the Kill-chain: How to keep America in the game when our enemies are 
trying to shut us out," Foreign Policy, May 17 2013.  
16 Hutchin, Cloppert, and Amin, 4. 
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   Continuing our example, consider an airfield. Airfields are a component of an air defense system, 
but their value lies in the function that they perform for the overall air defense system - providing a 
nearby launching point for intercept aircraft. An airfield, in turn, is composed of numerous elements 
that allow it to perform its function, and specific physical attributes (instantiations) that affect how it 
can be engaged. Some specific instantiations include the overall dispersion of the operations area, the 
hardness of concrete on the runways, and the vulnerability of combustible fuel depots. Planners 
consider these specifics when assessing how the airfield can be impacted. By impacting elements that 
support adversary processes, the overall components are degraded. With sufficient impacts to 
components, the functions that support the adversary processes, and ultimately the adversary system 
itself, can be stopped.17 
   Returning to countering cyberspace adversaries, it is important to operationally assess the hackers 
and cyber threats across their entire kill chain to identify potential functions that can be impacted 
through critical components and elements where an attack could be stopped during reconnaissance, 
exploitation, or any other phase. Like the kinetic example, preempting adversary exploitation efforts 
during earlier steps in the kill chain will likely be more cost effective and lower risk than trying to 
combat every cyber-attack as it comes – effectively swatting at arrows. 
   However, as with the kinetic military examples, trying to counter some early foundational activities 
supporting the kill chain may induce significant collateral effects while still not stopping a committed 
adversary. Like trying to preempt adversary air defense by targeting oil wells and refineries, 
attempting to stop hackers by causing ISPs to stop all traffic from large areas would likely be an 
affront to international norms and might only be feasible in extreme situations requiring necessary 
authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example Target System Components And Elements 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Targeting," Joint Publication 3-60. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 
2013). 
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 Brass Bullets 
 While acting earlier in the kill chain can be more effective, it is apparent that extreme actions 
affecting bystanders are neither appropriate nor effective. Rather than a single 'silver bullet' solution 
to cyber threats, a collection of constrained effects against target system elements is needed. In 
aggregate, a planned implementation of these 'brass bullets' can achieve the intended effect, either a 
denial or manipulation of the targeted functions.  
 To counter an adversary air defense system like the example, targeting only a single 
component is unlikely to succeed.18 However, degrading multiple components, like the radar system 
and airfields, increases the likelihood of having a significant aggregate effect against adversary air 
defense functions. In order to delay and disrupt airfield operations, numerous elements of an airfield 
could be impacted that in sum significantly degrade the airfield's operation.  
 The planning and targeting process begins with assumptions and continues to refine an 
understanding of the adversary's composition and processes through observation and intelligence. By 
studying how the adversary operates, it is possible to identify its critical requirements and 
vulnerabilities. Ultimately, by targeting significant critical requirements via associated 
vulnerabilities, impacts are generated against target components, degrading those adversary 
functions that threaten allied strategic goals.  
   In order to conduct cyber operations planning, operational planners study the cyber threat in the 
context of a kill chain framework across the three layers of cyberspace (physical, logical, and persona), 
to identify target system components, perhaps specific hacker sub-networks, to counter.19 Studying 
malicious cyber activity can identify elements within target components, such as malware or bots, 
making it possible to counter them. At this point in planning traditional military operations, specific 
aim points, like a building or server, are impacted by employing ordnance against them. However, in 
planning cyber operations, there remains yet another iteration of intelligence gathering and planning 
to be accomplished in order to non-kinetically deter or defeat a cyber-attack through cyberspace.   
 
3. TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 
A cyber threat target system element, such as a malicious executable, network control device, or 
database of hacker targets may be identified as one of several critical elements that could be impacted 
to diminish the overall cyber threat from a hacker group. The nuanced specifics related to software 
versions and threat network configurations must be accounted for when planning to impact them. 
Rather than simply engage an airfield or its fuel depots, this level of exquisitely detailed targeting is 
analogous to targeting specific rivets in the fuel tanks, well beyond the traditional tactical planning 
analogy.  
   At this technical level of planning, understanding specifically how malicious code propagates 
through victim networks, escalates privileges, and exfiltrates data creates a need for frequent 
rediscovery. Cyberspace morphs and develops at a pace exceeding conventional military analog. While 
militaries face an ongoing evolution of attack and defense capabilities over an arc of months to years, 
new variants of malicious code emerge daily. While the physical terrain of a battlefield is static, 
changes to logical networks can shift topology of cyberspace terrain almost instantly. Tactical 
planning identifying nodes as key target system elements alone is not enough; detailed technical data 
must be gathered continuously to stay abreast of dynamic components and their attributes, as well as 
to properly attribute the activity of those components to the correct sponsor. This data is complex, 
ever-changing, and will require a dynamic database environment to ensure that it is secured and 
organized logically. Access to this information will be critical for technical level planners to ensure 
that cyberspace capabilities at their disposal are appropriately matched to the environment that they 
                                                 
18 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Cyberspace Operations," Joint Publication 3-12(R). (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
February 3, 2015), ch 2. 
19 Ibid. 
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will be employed in, while an operational planner may only be concerned with the sum of impacts on 
adversary functions. Appropriate amounts of information on the component elements and proposed 
impacts must be coordinated through the tactical level to ensure overall alignment with the 
commander's intent.  
   The rapidly changing cyber environment challenges deliberate planning and, in fact, necessitates, at 
times, a continuous planning effort. Fortunately, planning at the target system level can proceed at a 
pace similar to traditional military planning, but it becomes critically important to select the right 
adversary requirements and vulnerabilities to target to allow technical operations to track and action 
cyber threat elements. 
 Implementation 
While specifically proposing how DoD cyber forces might take actions against adversary cyber target 
systems is beyond the scope of this paper, it is easy to appreciate how critical the concept of threat 
decomposition and 'brass bullet' solutions are to cyberspace operations. While there is a broad range of 
cyber threats, from script kiddies to hacktivist groups to nation state actors, network defenders must 
make resource investment decisions to prioritize their focus based on a strategic end state.20 Once 
focus areas have been determined, either specific threat actors or types of cyber-attacks, a deliberate 
framework is needed to study the life cycle of an attack. Once a threat's functions, requirements and 
vulnerabilities are identified, plans are developed to target the supporting components of the kill 
chain.  
   However, no single solution alone is likely to provide a robust response capability against a dynamic 
threat. Continual intelligence collection and detailed analysis is required. In no other endeavor is 
timely and accurate intelligence of such critical importance.21 A virus signature today may defeat an 
element of a threat's exploitation, but new or modified Trojans require development of new signatures. 
Blocking a malicious IP addresses may break an instantiation of a cyber threat's initial access, but a 
hacker could rapidly move to another IP range. In order to effectively defend against threats, it will be 
necessary to engage at multiple points along the kill chain so that the aggregate degradation of the 
threat allows an assured availability of protected networks and systems. By engaging multiple target 
system elements even when some change, other can still be preempted, preventing a full on cyber-
attack. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The military planning process is composed of deliberate steps that begin with the strategic ends in 
mind to shape plans and operations that force adversary threats to that desired end state. Analysis of 
components and elements of target systems identifies where forces can exert effects to disrupt the 
target system's function. Activities across the spectrum of operations from strategic to tactical are 
interdependently linked through feedback from actions at each level. This same process holds true in 
the cyberspace domain, with the addition of a nested level of technical planning and operations that 
translates between non-intuitive component-level impacts and readily understandable effects. 
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